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
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y
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z
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Abstract
This paper is the rst to introduce an algorithm to compute stationary equilib-
ria in stochastic games, and shows convergence of the algorithm for almost all such
games. Moreover, since in general the number of stationary equilibria is overwhelm-
ing, we pay attention to the issue of equilibrium selection. We do this by extending
the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games, called the stochastic
tracing procedure.
From a computational point of view, the class of stochastic games possesses sub-
stantial diculties compared to normal form games. Apart from technical diculties,
there are also conceptual diculties, for instance the question how to extend the lin-
ear tracing procedure to the environment of stochastic games.
We prove that there is a generic subclass of the class of stochastic games for which
the stochastic tracing procedure is a compact one-dimensional piecewise dierentiable
manifold with boundary. Furthermore, we prove that the stochastic tracing procedure
generates a unique path leading from any exogenously specied prior belief, to a
stationary equilibrium.
A well-chosen transformation of variables is used to formulate an everywhere
dierentiable homotopy function, whose zeros describe the (unique) path generated
by the stochastic tracing procedure. Because of dierentiability we are able to follow
this path using standard path-following techniques. This yields a globally convergent
algorithm that is easily and robustly implemented on a computer using existing
software routines.
As a by-product of our results, we extend a recent result on the generic niteness
of stationary equilibria in stochastic games to oddness of equilibria.
JEL classication: C63, C72, C73
Keywords: Game theory; Stochastic games; Computation of equilibria; Linear tracing
procedure.
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1 Introduction
Many economic situations of interest can be modeled as a stochastic game. Recent work of
for instance Olley and Pakes (1996), Pakes and Ericson (1998), Pakes and McGuire (1996),
and Bergemann and Valimaki (1996) is devoted to the application of stochastic games to
problems emerging in the industrial organization literature. In our opinion, further progress
in this research program can be made by developing methods to solve stochastic games
numerically. Numerical solution methods allow researchers to go back and forth between
the implications of economic theory and the characteristics of alternative datasets. See
also Judd (1997) and McKelvey and McLennan (1996) for an expression of the important
role of computational methods in the further development of economic theory.
The aim of this paper is to present an algorithm to compute a stationary equilibrium
for an arbitrary nite n-person discounted stochastic game. Even though such a game
may possess many non-stationary equilibria, there are good reasons to focus on stationary
equilibria. Several motivations for analyzing stationary equilibria can be found in Maskin
and Tirole (1997). Stationary strategies prescribe the simplest form of behavior that is
consistent with rationality, stationarity captures the notion that `bygones are bygones'
more completely than does the concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium, and it embodies
the principle that `minor causes should have minor eects', that is, only those aspects of the
past that are `signicant' should have an appreciable inuence on behavior. The pragmatic
motivations they give are that in applied theory, the focus on stationary strategies allows for
clean, unobstructed analysis of the inuence of the state variables, that stationary strategies
substantially reduce the number of parameters to be estimated in dynamic (econometric)
models, and that stationary models can be simulated.
For many normal form games there is a vast multiplicity of equilibria, see McLennan
(1999). There is no reason to expect that the situation is dierent for the multiplicity of
stationary equilibria in stochastic games. For this reason, we also nd it essential to provide
an algorithm that selects a particular stationary equilibrium. We introduce a variant of
the tracing procedure which allows selection within the class of stationary equilibria of
stochastic games. Finally, the algorithm should be fast in that it allows for the computation
of a stationary equilibrium for non-trivial stochastic games within reasonable time limits.
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley (1953). He considered both nite and
innite horizon two-person zero-sum stochastic games with nite state space and nite
action spaces. Shapley proved that such games have a value and that both players possess
optimal stationary strategies with respect to the discounted payo criterion.
Fink (1964), Takahashi (1964), and Sobel (1971) extended Shapley's model to general
2
n-person stochastic games. For the model with nite state space and nite action spaces
they showed the existence of a stationary equilibrium. In Breton, Filar, Haurie, and Schultz
(1986), Schultz (1986), Filar, Schultz, Thuijsman, and Vrieze (1991), and Breton (1991)
the problem of nding discounted stationary equilibria in the general n-person stochastic
game is reduced to that of nding a global minimum in a nonlinear program with linear
constraints. Solving this nonlinear program is equivalent to solving a certain nonlinear
system for which it is known that the objective value in the global minimum is zero. But,
as is noted in Breton (1991), the convergence of an optimization algorithm to the global
optimum is not guaranteed.
In this paper we propose an algorithm that is shown to converge to a stationary equilib-
rium for a generic n-person stochastic game. This algorithm is the rst globally convergent
algorithm to solve for an equilibrium in an arbitrary n-person stochastic game. The algo-
rithm also deals with the equilibrium selection problem in that it computes the stationary
equilibrium selected by a natural extension of the linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi and
Selten (1988), which we call the stochastic tracing procedure.
In Harsanyi and Selten (1988) the tracing procedure is dened for normal form games
and for extensive form games with a perfect recall information structure. Algorithms to
compute the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure in normal form games
are proposed in van den Elzen and Talman (1999), Herings and van den Elzen (1998),
and Herings and Peeters (1999). For extensive form games, Harsanyi and Selten (1988)
rst transform the game into one in standard form and subsequently dene the tracing
procedure for that class of games. Computation of the Nash equilibrium selected by the
tracing procedure in extensive form games is the topic of von Stengel, van den Elzen, and
Talman (1996), who invoke the sequence form to calculate such equilibria eciently. Since
expected utility in stationary strategies does not hold in stochastic games, it is not possible
to transform a stochastic game into one in standard form. The way to extend the tracing
procedure to the class of stochastic games is neither straightforward nor unique.
The algorithm belongs to the class of homotopy methods. The formulation as a dif-
ferentiable homotopy makes it possible to apply standard path-following techniques that
are available in professionally programmed software. This makes implementation on a
computer an easy exercise. As a by-product of the proof that the algorithm converges
for a generic stochastic game, we obtain the result that for a generic stochastic game the
stochastic tracing procedure yields a path leading to a unique stationary equilibrium.
As another by-product of our convergence proof, we obtain an extension of a recent
result of Haller and Laguno (2000). Their main result is that the set of stationary equi-
libria in a stochastic game is generically nite. A corollary to our main result is that this
3
nite number of equilibria is odd.
The paper has been organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model of the
nite discounted stochastic game. In Section 3 the restriction to stationary strategies is
made and the set of stationary equilibrium strategies is characterized. The denition of
the stochastic tracing procedure is given in Section 4. In Section 5, the properties of
the stochastic tracing procedure are studied. It is shown that for almost every stochastic
game, the stochastic tracing procedure is formed by a nite union of arcs and loops. Using a
well-chosen transformation of variables, the stochastic tracing procedure is described by the
zeros of an everywhere dierentiable homotopy function in Section 6. Section 7 discusses
the implementation of the homotopy algorithm and provides some numerical results.
2 Finite Discounted Stochastic Games
In this paper we study nite discounted stochastic games. Such a game is dened as
follows.
Denition 2.1 A nite discounted stochastic game is an ordered sextuple
  =


N;
; fS
i
!
g
(i;!)2N

; fu
i
g
i2N
; ; 

;
where N , 
 and S
i
!
are nite non-empty sets, S
!
=
X
i2N
S
i
!
, u
i
is a real-valued function
on the set H = f(!; s
!
) j! 2 
; s
!
2 S
!
g, where  is a map  : H ! (
) with (
) the
family of probability distributions on the space 
 and  is a discount factor.
The game parameters have the following meaning.
 N = f1; : : : ; ng is the player set.
 
 = f!
1
; : : : ; !
z
g is the state space.
 S
i
!
= fs
i
!1
; : : : ; s
i
!m
i
!
g is the action set of player i 2 N in state ! 2 
.
 u
i
: H ! R is the payo function of player i 2 N ; if in state ! 2 
 the players action
choices are s
!
= (s
1
!
; : : : ; s
n
!
) 2 S
!
=
X
i2N
S
i
!
, then player i gets an instantaneous
payo of u
i
(!; s
!
).
  : H ! (
) is the transition map. For each (!; s
!
) 2 H, we can identify (!; s
!
)
with the vector ((!
1
j!; s
!
); : : : ; (!
z
j!; s
!
)). Here (! j!; s
!
) represents the prob-
ability that the system jumps to state ! if in state ! the strategy-tuple s
!
is played.
Hence, (! j!; s
!
)  0 and
P
!2

(! j!; s
!
) = 1.
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  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor and is used to discount future payos.
Such a stochastic game corresponds to a dynamic system which can be in dierent states
and where at certain stages the players can inuence the course of the play. We consider
the innite horizon model and the set of stages is assumed to be identical with the set
N = f0; 1; : : :g. Players know the game itself and that this knowledge is common knowledge
among all the players. Moreover, the initial state !
0
at stage k = 0 is common knowledge
to the players.
For further analysis the following notations are introduced: S

=
S
(i;!)2N

S
i
!
, S =
X
(i;!)2N

S
i
!
, m

= jS

j =
P
(i;!)2N

m
i
!
, and m = jSj =
Q
(i;!)2N

m
i
!
. The game pro-
ceeds as follows. All players i select at the initial state, simultaneously and independently
of each other (possibly by a chance experiment) an action s
i
!
0
2 S
i
!
0
. Now two things
happen, both depending on the current state !
0
and the action choices s
1
!
0
; : : : ; s
n
!
0
,
(a) player i earns u
i
(!
0
; s
!
0
),
(b) the system jumps to the next state !
1
according to the outcome of a chance experi-
ment. The probability that the next state will be ! equals (! j!
0
; s
!
0
).
Subsequently, prior to the next stage k = 1, all players are informed about the previous
actions chosen by the players, and of the new state !
1
. At stage k = 1, the above procedure
is repeated, starting from the state !
1
.
We assume that the game is of perfect recall, i.e., at each stage each player remembers
all past actions chosen by all players and all past states that have occurred. Note that for
nite stochastic games, each stage game resembles a normal form game. However, contrary
to the situation with normal form games, the game does not consist of a single play, but
jumps according to the probability measure ( j!; s
!
) to the next state and continues
dynamically. In choosing an action in a certain state, a player not only takes into account
the immediate payo, but also his opportunities in future states.
Like in normal form games, the players are allowed to randomize their pure actions. A
mixed strategy of player i in state ! is a probability distribution on S
i
!
. We identify the
set of all probability distributions on S
i
!
with 
i
!
= f
i
!
2 R
m
i
!
+
j
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j
= 1g. For

i
!
2 
i
!
, the probability assigned to pure strategy s
i
!j
is given by 
i
!j
. The strategy space
of the normal form game in state ! is therefore equal to 
!
=
X
i2N

i
!
. Given a mixed
strategy combination 
!
2 
!
and a strategy 
i
!
2 
i
!
, we denote by (
 i
!
; 
i
!
) the mixed
strategy that results from replacing 
i
!
by 
i
!
. If a mixed strategy combination 
!
2 
!
is
played, then the instantaneous expected payo of player i is denoted by u
i
(!; 
!
) and the
expected transition to state ! by (! j!; 
!
).
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At the dierent stages this randomization may depend on the history of the game up
to that stage.
Denition 2.2 A history up to a stage k is a sequence h
k
= (!
0
; s
!
0
; !
1
; s
!
1
; : : : ; !
k 1
; s
!
k 1)
that could have occurred up to time k, k  1. Here !

represents the state and s
!

the
actions of the players at stage ,  = 0; : : : ; k   1.
Obviously, the set of histories up to time k equals H
k
=
X
k 1
=0
H, i.e., the k-fold Cartesian
product of H.
A behavior strategy 
ik
of player i species for each stage k, each state !
k
at time k,
and each history h
k
a probability distribution 
ik
(h
k
; !
k
) on the action space S
i
!
k
of player
i in state !
k
. Then 
ik
(s
i
!
k
j h
k
; !
k
) is the probability with which player i chooses action
s
i
!
k
2 S
i
!
k
at time k if state !
k
and history h
k
have occurred.
A stationary strategy for player i is a behavior strategy for which 
ik
(h
k
; !
k
) is of the
form 
i
(!
k
), i.e., a stationary strategy is a history and time independent strategy which
depends on the state only. In the sequel, a stationary strategy for player i will be denoted
by the symbol 
i
. We dene 
i
= (
i
!
1
; : : : ; 
i
!
z
), where 
i
!
is a probability measure on the
action space S
i
!
for each ! 2 
. So 
i
!
2 
i
!
. If player i decides to play the stationary
strategy 
i
, then every time that the system is in state !, player i selects his pure action
according to 
i
!
.
The above concepts lead to the following denition.
Denition 2.3 A behavior strategy 
i
for player i is a sequence 
i0
; 
i1
; : : : where 
i0
2

i
:=
X
!2


i
!
and 
ik
: H
k
! 
i
for all k  1. A stationary strategy 
i
for player i is an
element of 
i
.
Given initial state ! and strategy , the stream of expected payos is evaluated by
U
i
(!; ) :=
P
1
k=0

k
 U
ik
(!; );
where U
ik
(!; ) denotes the expected instantaneous utility at stage k. Here, U
i
(!; )
equals the total discounted expected payo of player i when the discount factor equals ,
the starting state is ! and the strategy-tuple  is played. Since the state and action spaces
are assumed to be nite, U
i
(!; ) exists.
Denition 2.4 A strategy-tuple  is an equilibrium if and only if 
i
is a best response to

 i
for all i 2 N .
If n = 2 and the payos are zero-sum, then the denition characterizes a minimax solution
(see Shapley (1953)).
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3 Stationary Equilibria
In the sequel of this paper we will restrict ourselves to stationary strategies.
1
Suppose that
! is the initial state and the players decide to play a stationary strategy-tuple . The total
discounted expected payo of player i is denoted by U
i
(!; ). The instantaneous payo
player i obtains in stage k = 0 equals u
i
(!; 
!
). The probability that at the next stage the
state will be ! equals (! j!; 
!
). This gives rise to the following theorem (see e.g. Fink
(1964)).
Theorem 3.1 When  is a stationary strategy-tuple and ! is the initial state, the expected
payos are given by the following recursive formula
U
i
(!; ) = u
i
(!; ) +  
P
!2

(! j!; 
!
)U
i
(!; ):
Denition 3.2 A stationary strategy-combination  2  is a stationary equilibrium if it
is a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies.
It is a very well-known result that there exists a stationary best response to stationary
strategies 
 i
. Therefore, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.3 A stationary strategy-combination  2  is a stationary equilibrium if for
all i and all !
U
i
(!; )  U
i
(!; 
 i
; 
i
); 
i
2 
i
:
Another famous result, see Fink (1964), Takahashi (1964), or Sobel (1971), is the existence
of a stationary equilibrium.
Theorem 3.4 Every nite discounted stochastic game has a stationary equilibrium.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the characterization of the set of stationary
equilibria that is useful for numerical computations. Given that the other players play 
 i
and the initial state is !, player i faces the Markov decision problem of maximizing
U
i
(!; 
 i
; 
i
)
subject to

i
!j
 0 (s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
);
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j
  1 = 0 (! 2 
);
1
In fact, we restrict ourselves to a class which is even tighter. Namely, the one of perfect stationary
strategies, where the strategy chosen is as if each state is reached or might be the initial state.
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for all possible initial states ! 2 
. If we dene by 
i
!
(k) the present value of the total
expected payo for a system in state ! with k transitions remaining, we obtain the basic
recurrence relation

i
!
(k + 1) = u
i
(!; 
!
) +  
P
!2

(! j!; 
!
)
i
!
(k)
or in vector form

i
(k + 1) = u
i
() + ()
i
(k):
Note that
2

i
= lim
k!1

i
(k) = lim
k!1
(
P
k 1
`=0
(())
`
u
i
() + (())
k

i
(0))
=
P
1
`=0
(())
`
u
i
() = [I   ()]
 1
u
i
():
The vector 
i
may be called the vector of present values of player i, because each of its
elements 
i
!
is the present value of an innite number of future expected payos discounted
by the discount factor  with ! the initial state.
Because we are interested in the sequential decision process for large k (in fact for k
equal to innity), we substitute the present values 
i
!
= lim
k!1

i
!
(k) for the quantities

i
!
(k) to obtain the recursive relation

i
!
= u
i
(!; 
!
) +  
P
!2

(! j!; 
!
)
i
!
:
Given that the other players play 
 i
, player i maximizes 
i
!
subject to 
i
!
2 
i
!
for all
! 2 
.
Because player i maximizes each 
i
!
for ! 2 
, he also maximizes
P
!2


i
!
. Given that
the other players play 
 i
, player i maximizes
P
!2


i
!
subject to
u
i
(!; 
 i
!
; 
i
!
) +  
P
!2

(! j!; 
 i
!
; 
i
!
)
i
!
  
i
!
= 0 (! 2 
);
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j
  1 = 0 (! 2 
);

i
!j
 0 (s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
):
2
By Hadamard's theorem all eigenvalues of the matrix between the squared brackets have absolute
value larger than 0. Thus zero is not an eigenvalue of that matrix and the inverse exists. Furthermore, the
spectral radius of () is less than one. Therefore it holds that [I ()]
 1
=
P
1
k=0

k
()
k
. From this
it is easily seen that the value of element (i; j) of the matrix [I   ()]
 1
gives the discounted expected
number of times that the state is j when i is the initial state and  is played.
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The necessary and sucient rst-order conditions for this maximization problem are

i
!

u
i
(!; 
 i
!
; s
i
!j
) +  
P
!2

(! j!; 
 i
!
; s
i
!j
)
i
!
	
+ 
i
!j
  
i
!
= 0
(s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
);

i
!j
 0; 
i
!j
 0; 
i
!j

i
!j
= 0 (s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
);
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j
  1 = 0 (! 2 
);
u
i
(!; 
 i
!
; 
i
!
) +  
P
!2

(! j!; 
 i
!
; 
i
!
)
i
!
  
i
!
= 0 (! 2 
);

i
[I   (
 i
; 
i
)] = 1 :
Here, ,  and  are the Lagrange multipliers of the rst, second and third set of constraints,
and 1 denotes the vector containing ones only. Then, for 
i
a best response to 
 i
,
0 = 
i
!

u
i
(!; 
 i
!
; 
i
!
) +  
P
!2

(! j!; 
 i
!
; 
i
!
)
i
!
	
+
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j

i
!j
 
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!

i
!j
= 
i
!

i
!
  
i
!
(! 2 
):
Therefore, since 
i
= [I   (
 i
; 
i
)]
 1
1 =
1
1 
1  0,
3

i
!

i
!
= 
i
!
:
After division by 
i
!
, the following necessary and sucient conditions remain, where 
i
!j
is dened as the ratio of 
i
!j
and 
i
!
u
i
(!; 
 i
!
; s
i
!j
) +  
P
!2

(! j!; 
 i
!
; s
i
!j
)
i
!
+ 
i
!j
  
i
!
= 0 (s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
);

i
!j
 0; 
i
!j
 0; 
i
!j

i
!j
= 0 (s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
);
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j
  1 = 0 (! 2 
):
Here, 
i
!j
is the shadowprice of playing strategy s
i
!j
, i.e., the disutility from a one-shot
deviation at t = 0 of a marginal increase in the probability 
i
!j
by which pure strategy s
i
!j
is played, and 
i
!
is the expected payo of player i when the initial state is !, 
 i
is played by
his opponents, and player i chooses a best response. The last equality,
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j
 1 = 0,
makes sure that 
i
!
is a member of 
i
!
for all ! 2 
.
Since for a stationary equilibrium it holds that a strategy-tuple constitutes mutually
best responses, we have found that the set of stationary equilibria can be fully characterized
by the system of equalities and inequalities in Theorem 3.5.
3
Since the value of element (i; j) of the matrix [I   ()]
 1
gives the discounted expected number of
times that the state is j when i is the initial state and  is played, the rows sum up to
1
1 
, which is larger
than 0 (even large than 1).
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Theorem 3.5 A strategy  2  is a stationary equilibrium if and only if it is part of a
solution to
u
i
(!; 
 i
!
; s
i
!j
) +  
P
!2

(! j!; 
 i
!
; s
i
!j
)
i
!
+ 
i
!j
  
i
!
= 0
(s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N);

i
!j
 0 
i
!j
 0; 
i
!j

i
!j
= 0 (s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N);
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j
  1 = 0 (! 2 
; i 2 N):
The system above suggests that only one-shot deviations have to be considered. We explain
intuitively the reason of this surprising phenomenon.
Suppose the other players play stationary strategies 
 i
and suppose that 
i
is the best
stationary response of player i. If player i is not able to improve his utility by a deviation
to his strategy 
i
in one stage only, then it follows by a backward induction argument,
that neither nitely many deviations to his strategy will make player i better o. Suppose
now that player i can improve his utility by innitely many changes. Then, by a prot-to-
go argument, player i can also increase his payo by nitely many changes, which is not
possible.
4
We end this section with an example in which it is shown that expected utility in
stationary strategies does not hold for the class of stochastic games. This causes a number
of technical diculties for the convergence proof of our algorithm.
Example 3.6 The stochastic game of Figure 1 is a game in which there are two states p
H
and p
L
and one player. In each state the player can choose between actions q
H
and q
L
. In
the upper-left corner of each square the intermediate payo of the player is displayed. In
the lower-right corner the transition probabilities are given. So, if the player chooses q
H
when the state is p
H
, then he earns 1 today and the next state will be p
L
with probability
1. If the player chooses q
L
when the state is p
L
, then he earns 1 today and the next state
will be p
H
for sure. Future payos are discounted by a factor 1/2.
Consider the strategies 
 
= (q
L
; q
H
) and 
+
= (q
H
; q
L
).
5
Then U(p
L
; 
 
) = U(p
H
; 
 
) =
1, U(p
L
; 
+
) = 2=3 and U(p
H
; 
+
) = 4=3. However,
U(p
H
;
1
2

 
+
1
2

+
) =
6
5
6=
7
6
=
1
2
 1 +
1
2

4
3
=
1
2
U(p
H
; 
 
) +
1
2
U(p
H
; 
+
);
U(p
L
;
1
2

 
+
1
2

+
) =
4
5
6=
5
6
=
1
2
 1 +
1
2

2
3
=
1
2
U(p
L
; 
 
) +
1
2
U(p
L
; 
+
):
4
Dene M = max
(i;!;s
!
)
ju
i
(!; s
!
)j. Then the maximum payo a player can earn from time k on is
bounded from above by 
k
(1++
2
+: : :)M =

k
1 
M , the so-called maximum `prot-to-go' value. Suppose
player i is able to improve his utility by " by means of innitely many changes. When k grows large the
prot-to-go value is at a certain point less then " (this is when k > log(
"(1 )
M
)= log()). This means that
the utility improvement by changes until time k (nitely many changes) was positive.
5
The rst argument is the strategy when the state is p
H
and the second when the state is p
L
.
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pH
q
H
q
L
1
(0; 1)
1
2
(
1
2
;
1
2
)
p
L
q
H
q
L
1
2
(
1
2
;
1
2
)
0
(1; 0)
 =
1
2
Figure 1: Example.
So, expected utility does not hold. 
In the literature on the computation of Nash equilibria in normal form games, a distinction
is made between 2-player games on the one hand and 3 or more players on the other
hand. For the class of 2-player games exact algorithms are possible, because of the bilinear
structure of such games (see, for instance the algorithm of Lemke and Howson (1964)).
For stochastic games this distinction disappears. The system of equations of Theorem 3.5
is not bilinear, even for 2-player games. The paper of Parthasarathy and Raghavan (1981)
presents an example of a 2-player stochastic game with only rational numbers of payos and
transition probabilities. The unique Nash equilibrium involves strategies with irrational
probabilities. This means that the ordered eld property does not hold. A straightforward
application of a Lemke-Howson type algorithm to 2-player stochastic games is therefore
not possible. This shows one more time that the class of stochastic games is considerably
more dicult than the class of normal form games.
4 The Stochastic Tracing Procedure
The linear tracing procedure as presented in Harsanyi and Selten (1988) models a process
of convergent expectations by which rational players will come to adopt, and expect each
other to adopt, a particular equilibrium as a solution for a given game. Before applying
the tracing procedure, every player is assumed to have a subjective probability distribution
expressing his expectation about the strategic choices of the other players. Each player is
assumed to use the same theory to determine his subjective probability distributions, which
makes that all players have the same expectations about the other players. This common
subjective probability distribution is called the prior. In the naive Bayesian approach,
all players choose best responses to their prior beliefs and would in this way reach a
strategy-combination that does not constitute an equilibrium in general. In the linear
11
tracing procedure, the information on the best responses is only gradually fed back into
the expectations of the players. As the linear tracing procedure proceeds, both the priors
and their best responses will gradually change until both converge to some equilibrium of
the game.
In Harsanyi and Selten (1988) the linear tracing procedure is dened for normal form
games and for extensive form games with a perfect recall information structure. For a
normal form game   = hN; fS
i
g
i2N
; fu
i
g
i2N
i and a prior p 2  the linear tracing pro-
cedure is dened by tracing a curve in the set of Nash equilibria of the games  
t
=
hN; fS
i
g
i2N
; fv
i
(t)g
i2N
i for t 2 [0; 1], where v
i
(t; s) = (1  t)u
i
(p
 i
; s
i
) + tu
i
(s). For exten-
sive form games, they rst transform the game into one in standard form and subsequently
dene the tracing procedure for that class of games. They did not dene the tracing pro-
cedure for stochastic games, which are games with instantaneous payos and innite time
horizon. Since expected utility in stationary strategies does not hold in stochastic games
(see Example 3.6) it is not possible to transform this game into one in standard form. The
extension of the tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games is far from obvious.
There are at least four ways to extend the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten to
the setting of stochastic games. Choices have to be made whether a player holds correlated
beliefs within a state or not, and whether a player holds correlated beliefs across time or
not. For the extension of the linear tracing procedure to stochastic games that we study
in this paper, we assume that beliefs are correlated within states and that they are not
correlated across time.
Correlation within states means that when a player knows that some opponent plays
according to the prior (which he expects with probability 1  t), he expects all opponents
to play according to the prior. This is equivalent to the way Harsanyi and Selten dene
the tracing procedure for normal form games.
Absence of correlation across time means that even when a player knows that his oppo-
nents are playing according to the prior today, these opponents might not play according
to the prior in future stages. In all future events he faces independent lotteries which as-
signs probability 1  t to play against the prior strategies of his opponents. Assuming that
beliefs are not correlated across time captures the assumption of stationarity. The beliefs
of a player depend only on the state reached and not on the time at which it is reached.
Consider some stochastic game   and some prior p 2 . For every t 2 [0; 1], the
stochastic tracing procedure generates a stationary equilibrium of the stochastic game
 
t
= hN;
; fS
i
!
g
!2
;i2N
; fv
i
(t)g
i2N
; ~(t); i, where the instantaneous payo function v
i
(t) :
12

 S ! R of player i is dened by
v
i
(t;!; s
!
) = (1  t)u
i
(!; p
 i
!
; s
i
!
) + tu
i
(!; s
!
)
and where the transition mapping ~(t) is dened by
~(t; ! j!; s
!
) = (1  t)(! j!; p
 i
!
; s
i
!
) + t(! j!; s
!
):
Note that ~(t) may be dierent for dierent players when t < 1. This is consistent with the
fact that the tracing procedure should be thought of as a reasoning process. The mapping
~(t) should be thought of as what the players think that the transition probabilities are
in the stochastic game  
t
. The expected payo of player i is easily shown to satisfy the
recursive relation
V
i
(t;!; ) = v
i
(t;!; 
!
) +  
P
!2

~(t; ! j!; 
!
)V
i
(t; !; ):
The stochastic game  
0
corresponds to a trivial stochastic game, where all players believe
that all their opponents play with probability 1 according to the prior belief. The stochastic
game  
1
coincides with the original stochastic game  . A best response against a strategy
combination 
 i
2 
 i
in the stochastic game  
t
corresponds to a best response against
the stationary probability distribution (1  t)[p
 i
]+ t[
 i
] on S
 i
in the stochastic game  .
The stochastic tracing procedure S( ; p) is dened as the set of pairs (t; ) for which it
holds that  is a stationary equilibrium of the stochastic game  
t
, i.e.,
S( ; p) =
n
(t; ) 2 [0; 1] 



 is a stationary equilibrium of  
t
o
:
The stochastic tracing procedure is said to be feasible if there exists a path in S( ; p)
connecting a best response against the prior to a stationary equilibrium of the stochastic
game  , i.e., there exists a continuous function  : [0; 1] ! S( ; p) such that (0) 2
S( ; p) \ (f0g  ) and (1) 2 S( ; p) \ (f1g  ). In general there may be many
trajectories ([0; 1]) that link a stationary equilibrium of  
0
to a stationary equilibrium
of  
1
. If this trajectory is unique, then the stochastic tracing procedure is said to be
well-dened. If the stochastic tracing procedure is well-dened, then it selects a unique
stationary equilibrium of the stochastic game  .
For a simple proof of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure for normal form
games see Herings (2000) and for the well-denedness see Herings and Peeters (1999). The
derivation of such properties for the stochastic tracing procedure is part of present paper.
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5 Structure of the Stochastic Tracing Procedure
The size of any stochastic game   can be characterized by a vector  = (n; z; fm
i
!
g
i=1;:::;n
!=1;:::;z
),
specifying the number of players, the number of states, and the number of pure strategies
available to a player in a state. We will call  the size vector of a stochastic game  . For
any possible size vector , transition map  consistent with  and discount factor , the
set G(; ; ) of all stochastic games   possessing  as their size vector, having  as their
transition map, and  as discount factor, is called the size class generated by (; ; ).
Every stochastic game   in the size class G(; ; ) is characterized by a vector u( )
that contains exactly nm payos. We identify a stochastic game   with the vector u( ),
and we identify the size class G(; ; ) with the set of all possible real vectors of size nm,
that is, with an nm-dimensional Euclidean space. It is now possible to dene the distance
%( ; 
0
) between two stochastic games and the Lebesgue measure of a set of stochastic
games.
A given mathematical statement Z is said to be true for an open set of (almost all,
set of generic) stochastic games if, for every possible size class G(; ; ), the set
~
G(Z) of
all stochastic games   in G(; ; ) for which the statement Z is true is open (has full
Lebesgue measure, is open and of full Lebesgue measure) with respect to G(; ; ).
Note that we x ,  and . It is possible to x only , and to dene open sets of (almost
all, generic sets of) games if these properties hold for every possible size class G(). All
our proofs can be readily adapted to get results corresponding to these denitions.
Let a subset B

of S

be given with the property that for every player i and for every
state ! there is at least one pure strategy s
i
!j
in B

, so B
i
!
= B

\S
i
!
6= ;, for every player
i, for every state !. Such a set B

is called admissible. The sets B

are used to decompose
S( ; p) in subsets S( ; p; B

), each having a dierentiable manifold structure. The set
S( ; p; B

) contains those elements of S( ; p) where only strategies in B

are played with
positive probability. It is dened by
S( ; p; B

) =
n
(t; ) 2 S( ; p)



s
i
!j
62 B

) 
i
!j
= 0
s
i
!j
2 B

) s
i
!j
2 argmax
s
i
!`
2S
i
!
V
i
(t;!; 
 i
; 
i
 !
; s
i
!`
)
o
:
It follows that
S( ; p) =
S
B

S( ; p; B

):
Two sets S( ; p; B

) and S( ; p;

B

) can only have a point (t; ) in common if there is a
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player i and a strategy s
i
!j
such that 
i
!j
= 0 and s
i
!j
2 argmax
s
i
!`
2S
i
!
V
i
(t;!; 
 i
; 
i
 !
; s
i
!`
),
so s
i
!j
is a best response to (
 i
; 
i
 !
) that is played with probability zero.
To analyze the structure of S( ; p) and the sets S( ; p; B

); we design systems of
equalities and inequalities whose solutions characterize these sets. By Theorem 3.5, an
element (t; ) belongs to S( ; p) if and only if it is part of a solution to
v
i
(t;!; 
 i
!
; s
i
!j
) +  
P
!2

~(t; ! j!; 
 i
!
; s
i
!j
)
i
!
+ 
i
!j
  
i
!
= 0
(s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N);

i
!j
 0; 
i
!j
 0; 
i
!j

i
!j
= 0 (s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N);
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j
  1 = 0 (! 2 
; i 2 N):
Given an admissible subset B

, we dene O( ; p; B

) as the set of solutions (t; ; ; ) to
the following system of equalities and inequalities:
(1) v
i
(t;!; 
 i
!
; s
i
!j
) +  
P
!2

~(t; ! j!; 
 i
!
; s
i
!j
)
i
!
+ 
i
!j
  
i
!
= 0
(s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N);
(2) 
i
!j
= 0 (s
i
!j
62 B
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N);
(3) 
i
!j
= 0 (s
i
!j
2 B
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N);
(4)
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j
  1 = 0 (! 2 
; i 2 N);
(5) 
i
!j
 0 (s
i
!j
2 B
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N);
(6) 
i
!j
 0 (s
i
!j
62 B
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N);
(7) t  0;
(8) 1  t  0:
The fact that for stochastic games the system of equalities and inequalities diers from the
case of normal form games, is not the only diculty. Since expected utility does not hold,
we can not use any property that is derived from it. In particular, it is not even obvious
that there is a unique best response to the prior in pure stationary strategies.
Theorem 5.1 implies that (t; ) 2 S( ; p; B

) if and only if there exists  2 R
m

and
 2 R
nz
such that the equalities (1)-(4) and the inequalities (5)-(8) are satised.
Theorem 5.1 Let a stochastic game   2 G() and a prior p 2  be given. For all
admissible subsets B

of S

, the sets S( ; p; B

) and O( ; p; B

) are C
1
dieomorphic.
Proof Let B

be an admissible subset of S

. For every i 2 N and ! 2 
 we take an element
s
i
!
2 B

. We dene a function f : [0; 1]! R R
m

R
m

R
nz
by f(t; ) = (t; ; ; ),
where (in vector form with a slight abuse of notation) 
i
= [I  
~
(t; 
 i
; s
i
)]
 1
v
i
(t; 
 i
; s
i
)
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and 
i
!`
= 
i
!
 v
i
(t;!; 
 i
!
; s
i
!`
)   
P
!2

~(t; ! j!; 
 i
!
; s
i
!`
)
i
!
. Then f(t; ) 2 O( ; p; B

)
if and only if (t; ) 2 S( ; p; B

). Note that f dened in this way is a C
1
dieomorphism.
2
From Theorem 5.1 it follows that for all (t; ) 2 S( ; p; B

) there is a unique  and a
unique  such that (t; ; ; ) 2 O( ; p; B

). Vice versa, for all (t; ; ; ) 2 O( ; p; B

) it
holds that (t; ) 2 S( ; p; B

).
The analysis of the system of equalities and inequalities (1)-(8) provides the following
result.
Theorem 5.2 For an open set of stochastic games and priors ( ; p) 2 G()   with
full Lebesgue measure, for all admissible subsets B

of S

, S( ; p; B

) is a compact 1-
dimensional C
1
manifold with boundary. Moreover, a boundary point (t; ) of S( ; p; B

)
is either
(i) not a boundary point of S( ; p;

B

) for all

B

6= B

and lies in f0; 1g  , or
(ii) is a boundary point of exactly one S( ; p;

B

) with

B

6= B

and belongs to (0; 1).
Moreover, B

and

B

dier in exactly one element, say s
i
!j
, for which 
i
!j
= 0 and
s
i
!j
is a best response to  in  
t
.
Proof The proof of this theorem is analogous to the proofs of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 of
Herings and Peeters (1999), and involves three lemmas. The only thing left to do is to
prove those lemmas for the stochastic game situation, which is done in the Appendix. The
inference is then analogously to the proofs of Herings and Peeters (1999), since it only uses
the structural manifold properties of the lemmas.
In Lemma A.1, we prove that the set of solutions to (1)-(8) is one-dimensional if the
inequalities are strict. Then in Lemma A.2, we prove that the set of solutions to (1)-(8)
is zero-dimensional if exactly one of the inequalities is binding. Finally, it is proved in
Lemma A.3 that there is no solution to (1)-(8) with more than one binding inequality.
It follows that O( ; p; B

) is a 1-dimensional manifold with boundary, and a point in
O( ; p; B

) is a boundary point if and only if exactly one of the inequalities in (5)-(8) holds
with equality. By Theorem 5.1 these properties carry over to S( ; p; B

).
It is easily seen that for a boundary point alternative (i) holds when the binding in-
equality comes from (7) or (8) and that alternative (ii) holds when the binding inequality
comes from (5) or (6). 2
This theorem implies that, for almost every   and p, for all admissible sets B

of S

the
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set S( ; p; B

) consists of a nite number of smooth arcs and loops.
6
Each arc has two
boundary points. The structure of S( ; p; B

) is therefore a simple one; all kinds of com-
plications like bifurcations, spirals, higher dimensional solution sets, diverging behavior,
etc. are excluded.
If S( ; p; B

) has a boundary point in (0; 1)  , then there is a unique admissible
subset

B

such that S( ; p;

B

) has this boundary point in common with S( ; p; B

). The
cardinality of

B

is one less or one greater than the cardinality of B

, depending on whether
in the common boundary point a strategy in B

is played with probability zero, or whether
a strategy not in B

is a best response. The uniqueness of the set

B

implies that the sets
S( ; p; B

) and S( ; p;

B

) are nicely linked to each other.
If S( ; p; B

) has a boundary point in f0; 1g, then this point does not belong to any
other set S( ; p; B

). This implies that such a boundary point is also a boundary point of
S( ; p).
Formally, the structure of S( ; p) is as follows.
Theorem 5.3 For an open set of stochastic games   2 G() and priors p 2  with
full Lebesgue measure, S( ; p) is a compact 1-dimensional piecewise C
1
manifold with
boundary. The boundary of S( ; p) is given by the intersection of S( ; p) and f0; 1g  .
There is a unique boundary point in f0g   which corresponds to a strategy-combination
in pure strategies.
Proof The intuition of the proof of the rst part of this theorem is given in the text above
the theorem. A rigorous proof can be given using the Lemke-Howson argument. For a
rigorous development of this argument, see for instance Herings and Peeters (1999).
The second part of the theorem, that there is generically a unique boundary point in
f0g   and that this boundary point is in pure strategies, remains to be shown.
Suppose there is a best response 
i
to the prior in mixed strategies. Then for some
state ! player i plays under 
i
at least two pure strategies with positive probability mass,
say s
i
!1
and s
i
!2
. Since 
i
is an optimal strategy it is part of a solution to the necessary
and sucient conditions above Theorem 3.5. So,

i
!1
= 
i
!2
= 0 and
u
i
(!; p
 i
!
; s
i
!1
) +  
P
!2

(! j!; p
 i
!
; s
i
!1
)
i
!
= 
i
!
=
= u
i
(!; p
 i
!
; s
i
!2
) +  
P
!2

(! j!; p
 i
!
; s
i
!2
)
i
!
:
6
Let X be a topological space. It is called an arc if it is homeomorphic to the closed unit interval [0; 1]
and it has two boundary points in this case; it is called a loop if it is homeomorphic to the unit circle in
R
2
and it has no boundary points in that case.
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It follows that every strategy 
i
with 
i
!1
; 
i
!2
 0 and 
i
 f!1;!2g
= 
i
 f!1;!2g
is a best
response to the prior. This contradicts the local niteness of the number of solutions at
t = 0. Therefore, generically, all best responses are in pure strategies.
Suppose there are two pure best responses 
i
and ^
i
against the prior. Then 
i
!
= ^
i
!
for all ! 2 
. Take 
i
=
1
2

i
+
1
2
^
i
, 
i
= 
i
, and 
i
!j
= 0 if 
i
!j
> 0 and 
i
!j
=


i
!j
otherwise.
Now indeed the complementarity conditions are satised and 
i
is a member of 
i
.
Suppose 
i
!j
> 0. Then it holds that 
i
!j
> 0 or ^
i
!j
> 0; suppose without loss of
generality that 
i
!j
> 0. Then
0 = u
i
(!; p
 i
!
; s
i
!j
) +  
P
!2

(! j!; p
 i
!
; s
i
!j
)
i
!
  
i
!
=
= u
i
(!; p
 i
!
; s
i
!j
) +  
P
!2

(! j!; p
 i
!
; s
i
!j
)
i
!
+ 
i
!j
  
i
!
:
Suppose 
i
!j
= 0. Then it holds that 
i
!j
= 0 and therefore 
i
!j
=


i
!j
. The equalities
above hold again.
It follows that 
i
is a best response to the prior. This contradicts that, generically, best
responses are pure. 2
For almost every   and p, the set S( ; p) consists of a nite number of arcs and loops.
Although it is not necessarily the case that these arcs and loops are smooth, the number
of non-dierentiabilities is nite at most. Theorem 5.2 implies that all arcs in S( ; p) start
and end in f0; 1g  . Each such path consists of a nite sequence of smooth arcs of the
sets S( ; p; B

). A loop in S( ; p) consists either of a nite sequence (at least two) of
dierentiable arcs of the sets S( ; p; B

) or is a loop of a set S( ; p; B

). See Figure 2 for
an impression of the structure of S( ; p).
0 1
t

  






Figure 2: The structure of S( ; p).
Generically, each player i has a unique best response to the prior for all possible initial
states, so generically there is exactly one point of S( ; p) that belongs to f0g. This point
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is both a corner point of f0g   and a boundary point of S( ; p; B

), where B

consists
of the following nz strategies: for each possible initial state and for each player the best
response to the prior. Given some initial state !, the determination of the best response
against the prior in state !, involves the determination of the behavior in all other states
! as well. So the nz independent strategies are found by solving n optimization problems,
as opposed to nz independent optimization problems. By Theorem 5.3 this point is the
starting point of a uniquely dened arc of S( ; p). This arc is the unique feasible path of
S( ; p) that transforms prior beliefs into (stationary) equilibrium beliefs.
Corollary 5.4 For an open set of stochastic games   2 G() and priors p 2  with full
Lebesgue measure, the stochastic tracing procedure is well-dened.
By following the feasible path starting in the unique point S( ; p) \ (f0g \ ) we nd a
stationary equilibrium of the stochastic game  . The set S( ; p)\ (f1g) consists of all
stationary equilibria of the stochastic game  . Precisely one of these stationary equilibria is
an element of the feasible path of S( ; p). Any other stationary equilibrium is a boundary
point of S( ; p) and is therefore part of some arc of S( ; p). A moment of reection makes
clear that the remaining stationary equilibria are pairwise connected by arcs from S( ; p),
and so the number of stationary equilibria is odd.
Corollary 5.5 For an open set of stochastic games   2 G() with full Lebesgue measure,
the number of stationary equilibria is odd.
The generic oddness of the number of Nash equilibria in normal form games is a well-known
result of Rosenmuller (1971), Wilson (1971), and Harsanyi (1973). The generic niteness
of the number of stationary equilibria in stochastic games is a recent result of Haller and
Laguno (2000). The corollary shows that Haller and Laguno's result can be sharpened
to oddness.
The observations made so far suggest the following algorithm for the computation of the
stationary equilibrium selected by the stochastic tracing procedure in n-person stochastic
games. Dene the admissible set B

that contains for each player i the best response to
the prior for all possible initial states, and start with a point (0; ) in S( ; p; B

) such
that 
i
!
is a best response of player i to the prior when ! is the initial state. Theorem 5.3
implies that B

and  are uniquely determined. The equalities (1)-(4) belonging to this
B

determine at least a part of the feasible path. As long as the inequalities (5)-(8) hold
with strict inequality we do not change our B

. As soon as one of the inequalities from
(5) or (6) gets binding, we change B

. When the binding inequality belongs to (5), say

i
!j
= 0 while s
i
!j
2 B

, we delete s
i
!j
out of B

. Obviously, this cannot happen for the
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starting B

. If the binding inequality belongs to (6), say 
i
!j
= 0 while s
i
!j
62 B

, we have
to add strategy s
i
!j
to B

. In both situations there is a strategy s
i
!j
for which 
i
!j
= 0
and 
i
!j
= 0. In general this leads to a kink in the feasible path of the stochastic tracing
procedure. This procedure is repeated over and over again, until the inequality (8) is
binding and a stationary equilibrium is found. Note that inequality (7) is only binding in
the starting point.
6 Smoothing the Stochastic Tracing Procedure
The previous section presents a method that can be used for the computation of a sta-
tionary equilibrium. However, switching homotopies can be a serious problem in terms
of computing time. There are
Q
(i;!)2N

(2
m
i
!
  1) dierent sets B

, whereas each one of
them may be generated several times in the course of the algorithm.
We follow a suggestion in Garcia and Zangwill (1981), also used in Herings and Peeters
(1999), and formulate one, everywhere dierentiable, homotopy by using a well-chosen
transformation of variables. Dene, for  2 R
m

,

i
!j
() = [maxf0; 
i
!j
g]
2
and 
i
!j
() = [maxf0; 
i
!j
g]
2
:
After this transformation of variables, the system of equalities and inequalities becomes
v
i
(t;!; 
 i
!
(); s
i
!j
) +  
P
!2

~(t; ! j!; 
 i
!
(); s
i
!j
)
i
!
+ 
i
!j
()  
i
!
= 0
(s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N);

i
!j
()  0; 
i
!j
()  0; 
i
!j
()
i
!j
() = 0 (s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N);
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j
()  1 = 0 (! 2 
; i 2 N):
Owing to the proposed transformation of variables, the conditions 
i
!j
()  0, 
i
!j
()  0
and 
i
!j
()
i
!j
() = 0 are trivially satised. We can reformulate the (in)equalities in (1)-
(8) that characterize the set O( ; p; B

) by considering solutions (t; ; ) 2 R R
m

R
nz
,
with 
i
!j
 0 if s
i
!j
2 B

and 
i
!j
 0 if s
i
!j
62 B

, to
(a) v
i
(t;!; 
 i
!
(); s
i
!j
) +  
P
!2

~(t; ! j!; 
 i
!
(); s
i
!j
)
i
!
+ 
i
!j
()  
i
!
= 0
(s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N);
(b)
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j
()  1 = 0 (! 2 
; i 2 N);
(c) t  0;
(d)   t+ 1  0:
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Notice that the same system of equalities and inequalities can be used, irrespective of the
set B

. The role of B

is taken over by the sign-combinations of the components of the
vector .
Counting equations and unknowns in the system (a)-(d) shows that there is one degree
of freedom, and therefore one expects a 1-dimensional solution set. Consider any solution
(t; ; ) to (a)-(d). When 
i
!j
= 0, then both 
i
!j
() and 
i
!j
() are zero. This implies
that we have exactly two admissible subsets of S

for which the set of (in)equalities (1)-(8)
are satised. If along a solution curve 
i
!j
is increasing while passing zero, then 
i
!j
()
gets positive and B

new
= B

old
[ fs
i
!j
g. If 
i
!j
is decreasing while passing zero, then 
i
!j
()
gets negative and B

new
= B

old
nfs
i
!j
g. When 
i
!j
passes zero, a kink appears in the method
proposed in Section 5.
The left-hand sides of the equalities (a)-(b) specify the homotopyH : [0; 1]R
m

R
nz
!
R
m

 R
nz
,
H(t; ; ) =
0
B
B
@
v
i
(t;!; 
 i
!
(); s
i
!j
) +  
P
!2

~(t; ! j!; 
 i
!
(); s
i
!j
)
i
!
+ 
i
!j
()  
i
!
= 0
(s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N)
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j
()  1 = 0 (! 2 
; i 2 N)
1
C
C
A
:
The homotopy function H is continuously dierentiable. The inequalities (c) and (d) are
satised as the homotopy takes [0; 1] as the domain for the variable t. Further, H has the
salient feature that its zeros describe the linear tracing procedure, (t; ; ) 2 H
 1
(f0g) if
and only if (t; ()) 2 S( ; p).
The set H
 1
(f0g) consists of nitely many dierentiable arcs and loops. All arcs start
and end in f0; 1gR
m

R
nz
. Loops have no points in common with f0; 1gR
m

R
nz
. There
is exactly one arc that starts in f0gR
m

R
nz
and that ends in f1gR
m

R
nz
. All other
arcs start and end in f1gR
m

R
nz
and connect two points inducing stationary equilibria
of the stochastic game  . Starting at the unique point (0; 
0
; 
0
) 2 H
 1
(f0g) at t = 0 and
following the path described by the zeros of H, we end up in a point (1; ~; ~) 2 H
 1
(f0g).
This point generates the stationary equilibrium (~) of   selected by the stochastic tracing
procedure. See Figure 3 for an impression of the structure of H
 1
(f0g).
The structure of H
 1
(f0g) is even simpler than the one of S( ; p). Not only are compli-
cations like bifurcations, spirals, higher dimensional solutions sets, diverging behavior, etc.,
excluded. The arcs and loops in H
 1
(f0g) are dierentiable everywhere. It is the transfor-
mation of variables that smoothes out the kinks. As a direct consequence, it is possible to
calculate the derivative at each point of the feasible path, which makes it possible to follow
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Figure 3: The structure of H
 1
(f0g).
the path by means of many easily implementable numerical methods, including methods
to solve ordinary dierential equations.
7 Implementation
The stochastic game  
0
naturally decomposes into n mutually independent and separate
Markov decision problems, one for each player. We have shown that generically a Markov
decision problem yields a unique optimal pure stationary strategy. The combination of
all optimal strategies (for each player one) induces the starting point of our algorithm.
This point can be determined analytically since there are nitely many pure stationary
strategies in each decision problem. We only have to compute the total discounted payos
for each pure stationary strategy of a player and observe which one generates the highest
payo.
Once we have determined the starting point, the numerical process starts by following
the homotopy-path from that point on. We have programmed a number of Fortran-
subroutines belonging to the software-package Hompack
7
, a Fortran77 program (see
Watson, Billups and Morgan (1987)). Hompack provides three qualitative dierent algo-
rithms for tracking the zero curve of the homotopy: ordinary dierential equation-based,
normal ow, and augmented Jacobian matrix. In general, the rst algorithm is the most
robust of the three algorithms, but is also the slowest, sometimes by a wide margin. Be-
ing risk-averse we used this algorithm, called fixpdf, for implementation. fixpdf is an
ordinary dierential equation-based algorithm working with dense Jacobian matrices.
We parameterize the homotopy path by pathlength  . Thus t = t(),  = () and
 = () along the homotopy path, and H(t(); (); ()) = 0 identically in  . The
7
http://www.netlib.org/hompack/index.html
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dierential equation is characterized by
d
d
H(t(); (); ()) = @H(t(); (); ()) 
0
@
dt=d
d=d
d=d
1
A
= 0;





dt
d
;
d
d
;
d
d





2
= 1:
and initial conditions given by
(t(0); (0); (0)) = H
 1
(f0g) \ (f0g  R
m

 R
nz
);
so t(0) = 0 and ((0); (0)) corresponds to the best response to the prior. The homo-
topy path corresponds to the trajectory of this initial value problem. When t( ) = 1,
((); ()) is a zeropoint of H and (()) is a stationary equilibrium of stochastic game
  with equilibrium payo (). Complete details for solving the initial value problem are
given in Watson (1979) and Watson and Fenner (1980).
We have implemented the homotopy function as described in Section 6 for stochastic
games with 2 states, 3 players, with in each state 2 strategies for each player. It may be
possible to improve on computing times by rescaling utilities and probabilities, or by using
an -transformation with a power dierent from 2 (but larger than 1, to keep dieren-
tiability) or multiplied by a positive scalar dierent from 1. An extensive digress on the
optimal numerical implementation is beyond the aim of the current paper.
Within the class of stochastic games with 2 states, 3 players and for each player 2
strategies in each state, we have generated ve randomly chosen stochastic games and
ve randomly chosen priors. All payos, transition probabilities, and priors are chosen
independently from one another out of the uniform distribution on [0; 1]. The transition
probabilities and the priors are of course normalized to sum up to 1. The discount factor
is xed at 0.95.
The maximal inaccuracy of our calculation amounts to 10
 8
, which means that the 2-
norm of the value of the homotopy function is less than 10
 8
in the computed equilibrium.
In Table 1 the computing times to compute a stationary equilibrium for each game-prior
pair are displayed. The mean time to compute a stationary equilibrium is 1:26 seconds
with a standard deviation of 0:23 seconds. For the games we found on average 1:60 dierent
equilibria with a standard deviation of 0:89 when 5 dierent priors where used. So, the
algorithm is quite fast and multiple equilibria can be found.
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prior 1 prior 2 prior 3 prior 4 prior 5
game 1 1.31 1.09 1.21 1.38 1.32
game 2 0.82 1.37 1.27 1.43 1.10
game 3 1.59 1.21 1.43 1.31 1.42
game 4 1.27 1.15 1.27 1.65 0.93
game 5 1.54 0.77 0.88 1.26 1.48
Table 1: Computation times in seconds
A Proofs
To make the proofs as transparent as possible, we need some notations and denitions from
the theory of regular constraint sets as presented in Jongen, Jonker and Twilt (1983), see
also Herings (1997) for a rst application of this theory in economics.
For some r  1 a subsetM of R
m
is called a k-dimensional C
r
manifold with generalized
boundary (MGB), if for every x 2 M there exists a C
r
dieomorphism  : U ! V , where
U is an open subset of R
m
containing x and V is open in R
m
, and some integer `(x)  0,
such that (x) = 0 and (U \M) equals fy 2 V j y
i
= 0; i = 1; : : : ; m  k; and y
i
 0; i =
m  k+ 1; : : : ; m  k+ `(x)g. If for every element x of an MGB M it holds that `(x)  1,
then M is called a manifold with boundary and the set of elements x for which `(x) = 1 is
an (k   1)-dimensional manifold, called the boundary of M .
One way to show that a set is an MGB is by showing that it is a regular constraint set.
Let J
1
and J
2
be two nite index sets and let g
j
for all j 2 J
1
and h
j
for all j 2 J
2
, be C
r
functions dened on some open subset X of R
m
. We dene
M [g; h] =
n
x 2 X



g
j
(x) = 0; 8j 2 J
1
, and h
j
(x)  0; 8j 2 J
2
o
:
For x 2 X we dene the set J
0
(x) = fj 2 J
2
j h
j
(x) = 0g. If for every x 2M [g; h] it holds
that
n
@
x
g
j
(x)



j 2 J
1
o
[
n
@
x
h
j
(x)



j 2 J
0
(x)
o
is a set of independent vectors, then M [g; h] is called a C
r
regular constraint set (RCS). In
Jongen, Jonker and Twilt (1983) it is shown that every C
r
RCS is an (m jJ
1
j)-dimensional
C
r
MGB with `(x) = jJ
0
(x)j for every x 2M [g; h].
In this entire appendix, we x a size vector , a transition mapping , a discount factor
, and a prior p 2 . For any tuple of utility functions u and any admissible subset B

, we
dene the functions g
B

;u
: R
1+2m

+nz
! R
2m

+nz
and h
B

;u
: R
1+2m

+nz
! R
m

+2
in such
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a way that g
B

;u
equals the left-hand side of the equalities (1)-(4) and h
B

;u
the left-hand
side of the inequalities (5)-(8),
g
B

;u
(t; ; ; ) =
8
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
:
v
i
(t;!; 
 i
!
; s
i
!j
) + 
i
!j
  
i
!
+ 
P
!2

~(t; ! j!; 
 i
!
; s
i
!j
)
i
!
(s
i
!j
2 S
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N)

i
!j
(s
i
!j
62 B
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N)

i
!j
(s
i
!j
2 B
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N)
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j
  1 (! 2 
; i 2 N)
and
h
B

;u
(t; ; ; ) =
8
>
>
<
>
:

i
!j
(s
i
!j
2 B
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N)

i
!j
(s
i
!j
62 B
i
!
; ! 2 
; i 2 N)
t
 t+ 1
:
A point (t; ; ; ) 2 O( ; p; B

) is a solution of (1)-(8) if and only if g
B

;u
(t; ; ; ) = 0
and h
B

;u
(t; ; ; )  0.
Let the functions g
B

: R
1+2m

+nz
 R
mn
! R
2m

+nz
and h
B

: R
1+2m

+nz
 R
mn
!
R
m

+2
be dened such that g
B

(t; ; ; ; u) = g
B

;u
(t; ; ; ) and h
B

(t; ; ; ; u) =
h
B

;u
(t; ; ; ) for all u 2 R
mn
. Figure 4 presents the matrix of derivatives of the functions
g
B

and h
B

with respect to all variables. The stars (?) in the matrix need not to be
specied for our analysis.
Each row in Figure 4 corresponds to one of the equalities and inequalities in (1)-(8).
To make the gure more clear, derivatives with respect to  are rst taken for s
i
!j
2 B

.
The same applies to the derivatives with respect to  and the ordering of the equalities in
(1). From the properties listed below the matrix, it follows immediately that the matrices
@
u
v and E have full row rank.
The structure of the proof of Theorem 5.2 is as follows. First, it is shown that for
almost all games u, M [g
B

;u
; h
B

;u
] is a regular constraint set, from which the manifold
structure of L( ; p; B

) follows immediately. Next it is shown that there is an open set
of full measure for which the manifold structure holds. For the rst part of the proof, we
show that for almost all games u, for every x 2M [g
B

;u
; h
B

;u
],
n
@
x
g
B

;u
j
(x)



j 2 J
1
o
[
n
@
x
h
B

;u
j
(x)



j 2 J
0
(x)
o
is a set of independent vectors. To show this we need three lemmas, Lemmas A.1, A.2 and
A.3. Lemma A.1 handles points x for which J
0
(x) = ;, Lemma A.2 deals with points x
such that the cardinality of J
0
(x) is one, and Lemma A.3 implies that J
0
(x) contains one
element at most.
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
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S
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S
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
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1
1
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m
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
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?
@
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 1
0 0 0 0
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0
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
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0
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0
) = (i; !)
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Figure 4: The matrix of partial derivatives of g
B

and h
B

.
Lemma A.1 Let a prior p 2  and an admissible subset B

of S

be given. Then, for
almost all u, g
B

;u
t
>
f0g:
Proof Consider a point (

t; ;

; ; u) such that g
B

(

t; ;

; ; u) = 0. The matrix of partial
derivatives of g
B

at (

t; ;

; ; u) is given by the rows (1)-(4) in Figure 4. We show rst
that this matrix has full row rank, from which it follows that g
B

t
>
f0g.
Since @
u
v() has full row rank and the derivative with respect to u in (2)-(4) is zero, it is
sucient to show that the part of the matrix given by (2)-(4) has full row rank. Since the
derivative with respect to  in (3) has full row rank, whereas the derivative with respect to
 in (2) and (4) is zero, it is sucient to show that the rows in (2) and (4) are independent.
The admissibility of B

implies that the derivative with respect to 
B

in (4) has full row
rank. Since, the derivative with respect to 
B

in (2) is zero, the only thing left to prove is
that (2) has independent rows, which is obvious from the derivative with respect to 
S

nB

.
Consequently, g
B

t
>
f0g.
By the transversality theorem (see, for example Mas-Colell (1985), theorem I.2.2) and
since g
B

is a C
1
function, it follows that the complement of the set

u 2 R
mn
j g
B

;u
t
>
f0g
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has Lebesgue measure zero. 2
Lemma A.2 Let a prior p 2  and an admissible subset B

of S

be given. Moreover, let
an inequality j
0
2 f1; : : : ; m

+ 2g be given. Then, for almost all u, (g
B

;u
; h
B

;u
j
0
)t
>
f0g.
Proof Consider a point (

t; ;

; ; u) such that g
B

(

t; ;

; ; u) = 0 and h
B

j
0
(

t; ;

; ; u) =
0. The matrix of partial derivatives of (g
B

; h
B

j
0
) at (

t; ;

; ; u) is given in Figure 4 by
the rows (1)-(4) and a single row related to h
B

j
0
in (5)-(8). We show rst that this matrix
has full row rank, from which it follows that (g
B

; h
B

j
0
)t
>
f0g.
If row j
0
belongs to (6), (7) or (8), then it follows from the derivative with respect to

S

nB

or from the derivative with respect to t that row j
0
has rank 1. Since all other
derivatives in row j
0
are zero, it follows as in the proof of Lemma A.1 that the rows of
(1)-(4) together with row j
0
are independent. Consider the case where row j
0
belongs to
(5). Following the rst part of the proof of Lemma A.1, it suces to prove that (2) and (4)
together with row j
0
are independent. Inequality h
B

j
0
states that 
i
!j
0
 0, s
i
!j
0
2 B

, and
this inequality is now required to hold with equality. Since
P
s
i
!j
2S
i
!

i
!j
  1 = 0, it follows
that jB
i
!
j = jB

\ S
i
!
j > 1. Then the row related to s
i
!j
0
together with (2) and (4) trivially
form an independent set. Consequently, (g
B

; h
B

j
0
)t
>
f0g. By the transversality theorem it
follows that the complement of fu 2 R
mn
j (g
B

;u
; h
B

;u
j
0
)t
>
f0gg has Lebesgue measure zero.
2
Lemma A.3 Let a prior p 2  and an admissible subset B

of S

be given. Moreover,
let inequalities j
0
; j
00
2 f1; : : : ; m

+ 2g with j
0
6= j
00
be given. Then, for almost all u,
(g
B

;u
; h
B

;u
j
0
; h
B

;u
j
00
)t
>
f0g.
Proof Consider a point (

t; ;

; ; u) such that g
B

(

t; ;

; ; u) = 0, h
B

j
0
(

t; ;

; ; u) = 0,
and h
B

j
00
(

t; ;

; ; u) = 0. The matrix of partial derivatives of (g
B

; h
B

j
0
; h
B

j
00
) at (

t; ;

; ; u)
is given in Figure 4 by the rows (1)-(4) and two rows related to h
B

j
0
and h
B

j
00
in (5)-(8). We
show rst that this matrix has full row rank, from which it follows that (g
B

; h
B

j
0
; h
B

j
00
)t
>
f0g.
The case where the two rows are not equal to (7) and (8) is similar to the proof of
LemmaA.2. Rows (7) and (8) are not independent. However, they cannot be binding simul-
taneously, because then it holds that t = 0 and t = 1. Consequently, (g
B

; h
B

j
0
; h
B

j
00
)t
>
f0g.
It follows that the complement of the set fu 2 R
mn
j(g
B

;u
; h
B

;u
j
0
; h
B

;u
j
00
)t
>
f0gg has Lebesgue
measure zero. 2
References
Bergemann D., and J. Valimaki (1996), \Learning and Strategic Pricing", Econometrica,
64, 1125-1149.
27
Breton M. (1991), \Algorithms for Stochastic Games", in T.E.S. Raghavan, T.S. Ferguson,
T. Parthasarathy, and O.J. Vrieze (eds.) Stochastic Games and Related Topics, Series C:
Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research, 45-57.
Breton M., J.A. Filar, A. Haurie, and T.A. Schultz (1986), \On the computation of Equi-
libria in Discounted Games", in T. Basar (ed.) Dynamic Games and Applications in Eco-
nomics, Lecture Notes on Economics and Mathematical Systems no.205, Springer-Verlag,
Berlin.
Elzen A.H. van den, and Talman, A.J.J. (1999), \An Algorithmic Approach towards the
Tracing Procedure for Bi-matrix Games", Games and Economic Behavior, 28, 130-145.
Filar J.A., T.A. Schultz, F. Thuijsman, and O.J. Vrieze (1991), \Nonlinear programming
and stationary equilibria in stochastic games", Mathematical Programming, 50, 227-237.
Fink A.M. (1964), \Equilibrium in a stochastic n-person game", Journal of Science of
Hiroshima University Series A-I, 28, 89-93.
Garcia C.B., and W.I. Zangwill (1981), Pathways to Solutions, Fixed Points, and Equilib-
ria, Prentice Hall, Englewood Clis.
Haller H., and R. Laguno (2000), \Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic
Games", Econometrica, 68, 1231-1248.
Harsanyi J.C. (1973), \Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points", International Jour-
nal of Game Theory, 2, 235-250.
Harsanyi J.C., and R. Selten (1988), A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games,
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Herings P.J.J. (1997), \A Globally and Universally Stable Price Adjustment Process",
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 27, 163-193.
Herings P.J.J. (2000), \Two Simple Proofs of the Feasibility of the Linear Tracing Proce-
dure", Economic Theory, 15, 485-490.
Herings P.J.J., and A.H. van den Elzen (1998), \Computation of the Nash Equilibrium
Selected by the Tracing Procedure in N -Person Games", CentER Discussion Paper, No.
9804, Tilburg University. Accepted for Games and Economic Behavior subject to minor
suggestion for modication.
Herings P.J.J., and R.J.A.P. Peeters (1999), \A Dierentiable Homotopy to Compute Nash
28
Equilibria of n-Person Games", Meteor Research Memorandum 99/33, University of Maas-
tricht, Maastricht. Forthcoming Economic Theory.
Jongen H.T., P. Jonker, and F. Twilt (1983), Nonlinear Optimization in R
n
, I. Morse
Theory, Chebyshev Approximation, Methoden und Verfahren der mathematische Physik,
29, Peter Lang, Frankfurt.
Judd K.L. (1997), \Computational Economics and Economic Theory: Substitutes and
Complements?", Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 21, 907-942.
Lemke C.E., and J.T. Howson Jr. (1964), \Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games", SIAM
Journal on Applied Mathematics, 12, 413-423.
Mas-Colell A. (1985), The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium: A Dierentiable Ap-
proach, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Maskin E., and J. Tirole (1997), \Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions",
mimeo.
McKelvey R., and A. McLennan (1996), \Computation of Equilibria in Finite Games", in
H.M. Amman, D.A. Kendrick, and J. Rust (eds.), Handbook of Computational Economics,
Volume I, Elsevier Science.
McLennan A. (1999), \The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game",
mimeo.
Olley G.S., and A. Pakes (1996) \The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunica-
tions Equipment Industry", Econometrica, 64, 1263-1298.
Pakes A., and R. Ericson (1998), \Empirical Implications of Alternative Models of Firm
Dynamics", Journal of Economic Theory, 79, 1-45.
Pakes A., and P. McGuire (1996), \Stochastic Algorithms, Symmetric Markov Perfect
Equilibrium, and the `Curse' of Dimensionality", mimeo. Forthcoming Econometrica.
Parthasarathy, T., and T.E.S. Raghavan (1981), \An Ordereld Property for Stochastic
Games when One Player Controls Transition Probabilities", Journal of Optimization The-
ory and Applications, 33, 375-392.
Rosenmuller J. (1971), \On a Generalization of the Lemke-Howson Algorithm to Nonco-
operative N -Person Games", SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 21, 73-79.
29
Schultz T.A. (1986),Mathematical Programming and Stochastic Games, Ph.D. Thesis, The
John Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.
Shapley L.S. (1953), \Stochastic Games", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
of the United States of America, 39, 1095-1100.
Sobel M.J. (1971), \Non-cooperative Stochastic Games", The Annals of Mathematical
Statistics, 42, 1930-1935.
Stengel B. von, A. van den Elzen, and A.J.J. Talman (1996), \Tracing Equilibria in Exten-
sive Games by Complementary Pivoting", CentER Discussion Paper, No. 9686, Tilburg
University.
Takahashi M. (1964), \Equilibrium points of stochastic, noncooperative n-person games",
Journal of Science of Hiroshima University Series A-I, 28, 95-99.
Watson L.T. (1979), \A Globally Convergent Algorithm for Computing Fixed Points of
C
2
Maps", Applied Mathematic and Computation, 5, 297-311.
Watson L.T., S.C. Billups, and A.P. Morgan (1987), \HOMPACK: A Suite of Codes for
Globally Convergent Homotopy Algorithms", ACM Transactions on Mathematical Soft-
ware, 13, 281-310.
Watson L.T., and D. Fenner (1980), \Chow-Yorke Algorithm for Fixed Points or Zeros of
C
2
Maps", ACM Transactions on Mathematical Software, 6, 252-260.
Wilson, R. (1971), \Computing Equilibria of N -Person Games", SIAM Journal on Applied
Mathematics, 21, 80-87.
30
